The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and Property Law Essay by Frankel, Tamar
Boston University School of Law 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law 
Faculty Scholarship 
5-1993 
The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and 
Property Law Essay 
Tamar Frankel 
Boston University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Other Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and Property Law Essay, 73 
Boston University Law Review 389 (1993). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/741 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access 
by Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty 
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons at Boston University School of Law. For more 
information, please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.  
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Tue Nov 12 10:55:09 2019
Citations:
Bluebook 20th ed.
			                                                                
Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and Property
Law, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 389 (1993).                                                     
ALWD 6th ed.                                                                         
Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and Property
Law, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 389 (1993).                                                     
APA 6th ed.                                                                          
Frankel, T. (1993). The legal infrastructure of markets: The role of contract and
property law. Boston University Law Review, 73(3), 389-406.                          
Chicago 7th ed.                                                                      
Tamar Frankel, "The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and
Property Law," Boston University Law Review 73, no. 3 (May 1993): 389-406            
McGill Guide 9th ed.                                                                 
Tamar Frankel, "The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and
Property Law" (1993) 73:3 BUL Rev 389.                                               
MLA 8th ed.                                                                          
Frankel, Tamar. "The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and
Property Law." Boston University Law Review, vol. 73, no. 3, May 1993, p. 389-406.
HeinOnline.                                                                          
OSCOLA 4th ed.                                                                       
Tamar Frankel, 'The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and
Property Law' (1993) 73 BU L Rev 389
Provided by: 
Fineman & Pappas Law Libraries
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and 
Conditions of the license agreement available at 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from  uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your  license, please use:
Copyright Information
Use QR Code reader to send PDF to your smartphone or tablet device
ESSAY
THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF MARKETS: THE
ROLE OF CONTRACT AND PROPERTY LAW
TAMAR FRANKEL*
INTRODUCTION
Markets are social institutions that facilitate exchange transactions.
Therefore, they require a regime of freedom to exchange-a contract regime.
Markets can be made more efficient by reducing the transaction and infor-
mation costs for market actors. Such a reduction can be effected by stan-
dardizing the products exchanged, the terms of the transactions, and the
nature of the rights transferred. Information costs can be reduced by pub-
licizing the transactions' and by using the services of intermediaries.2
Some of the conditions that enhance market efficiencies can be imposed
and regulated privately by market participants. However, it is not always
possible for these participants, acting separately, to create and enforce all
these conditions on their own.3 Therefore, some of these conditions must be
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. My thanks to Dean Ronald
Cass, and Professors Robert Bone, Frank Michelman, and Robert Seidman for their
comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. The responsibility for the text is, of course,
fully mine. I am grateful to Stephen Edwards, Gregory Gilbert, Ron Honig, and Kevin
Royer for very helpful research and editorial work.
I For an analysis of the contributions of stock exchanges to efficient markets that
emphasizes similar factors, see Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as
a Firm: The Emergence of Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock
Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1007 (1990).
2 Intermediaries-such as brokers or dealers-not only reduce the cost of transactions,
but also help increase the number of transactions. More intermediaries attract more mar-
ket buyers and sellers. This definition of markets excludes, for example, fairs in which
producers and buyers meet directly to exchange their goods. See 1 TAMAR FRANKEL,
SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSETS POOLS, AND ASSET-
BACKED SECURITIES § 3.1, at 67-68 (Ronald S. Borod ed., 1991) (discussing criteria
helpful in assessing the market benefits of intermediation systems).
Efficient markets also require numerous and dispersed sellers and buyers. Antitrust
legislation and the common law doctrine of restraint of trade were designed to prevent
concentrations of buyers or sellers and promote market efficiency.
I These conditions might conflict with the short-term self-interest of some sellers. For
example, buyers' information costs may increase if sellers compete by distinguishing their
wares from those of other sellers in many and confusing ways. Buyers' information costs
389
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established by law. I define "law" here as rules, and customs that are
deemed coercive. Some scholars emphasize the spontaneous-rather than
the regulatory--quality of markets. Friedrich Hayek, for example, questions
the extent to which we can control markets, but concedes that his spontane-
ous order can rest "on rules which are entirely the result of deliberate
design."4 I argue that efficient markets must rest on coercive rules, not
merely that they can rest on such rules.
I consider the law regulating markets to be a subset of property law.
Although the laws of property and contract overlap, market regulation and
its underlying values and policies are more akin to those of property law
than to those of contract law.5
In sum, the institution of markets requires a contract regime and a prop-
erty regime. However, some contract rules are incompatible with property
rules.' For example, under contract law, not all contract rights are transfer-
may also increase if sellers "pass off" their products as those of their competitors. In
both cases, buyers might offer lower prices to compensate for their trouble. Further, an
institutional framework established by sellers in a particular market may reduce competi-
tion among them because they might collude to set terms and prices.
Legal rules might be necessary to equalize the regulatory regime among various market
actors and create a fair "level playing field." In addition, government intervention is
sometimes needed when the private sector is unable or unwilling to bear the cost of creat-
ing new instruments or markets, or to bear the cost of collecting necessary information
and marshalling required expertise. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 2, § 1.04, at 1-15 (the
techniques for securitizing loans were developed with the active initiative and help of the
United States Government); Tamar Frankel, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on
Economic Growth and Credit Formation of the Committee on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 16, 1993) (transcript on file
with the Boston University Law Review); Howell E. Jackson, What Should the Federal
Government Do to Promote a Secondary Market for Business and Commercial Loans?,
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Economic Growth and Credit Formation of the
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives
(Apr. 21, 1993) (transcript on file with the Boston University Law Review) (the govern-
ment can interfere in the markets by offering credit enhancement).
4 1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 46 (1973); see also id.
at 36-37, 41.
1 Arguably, there is no justification for grouping rules that regulate markets under
property law and distinguishing this group of rules from contract law. Markets are regu-
lated in part by property law and by rules from other legal categories, including contract
or antitrust. Perhaps a new term, such as "market law," representing all rules governing
markets, may be more precise.
I use the traditional names of property and contract for several reasons. First, I believe
that both lawyers and non-lawyers share a general understanding of "contract" and
"property." Although the use of the term "property" for market regulation may sacrifice
precision, this general understanding is preserved. Besides, I doubt whether a name of a
legal category can ever be precise. Ultimately, the creation of a new category for market
regulation would demand a level of time and attention unnecessary for this discussion.
6 Contract and property law are even less compatible when the property right traded
[Vol. 73:389
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able. Additionally, the parties to a contract are allowed to prohibit the
transfer of their contract rights. By contrast, under property law, property
rights are transferable, and a total prohibition on the transfer of property
rights is unenforceable.7 In general, contract law allows the parties far more
freedom to design the terms of their agreement than property law does.
I argue that if we wish to create and maintain efficient markets, contract
law-especially the freedom of contracting parties to customize their rela-
tionship-must yield to the mandatory rules of property law.' This argu-
ment applies to a broad ongoing movement in our society to "propertize" 9
tangibles and intangibles-such as legal relationships-and create markets
in them,' ° barring public policies to the contrary."
in the markets is an intangible legal obligation such as a debt. Still, the clash between the
two legal areas persists even if the traded property is tangible. See infra part II.
7 See infra part II.B.
8 See 2 FRANKEL, supra note 2, § 15.4, at 129-34, § 20.4.3, at 302-06; Barton Crock-
ett, System Set Up to Ease Confusion in Managing Syndications, AM. BANKER, Apr. 23,
1993, at 3.
1 By "propertize," I mean creating the privilege of entry and use as well as the legal
right to exclude others from this privilege. Note, for example, the recognition by state
courts, of a spouse's property rights in the graduate degrees attained by the other spouse.
See, e.g., Lovett v. Lovett, 688 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Ky. 1985) ("although a professional
degree ... may not be property in the literal sense, they are assets of the marriage" for
purposes of dividing marital property); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 715 (N.Y.
1985) ("[M]arital property encompasses a license to practice medicine to the extent that
the license is acquired during the marriage."). But see Archer v. Archer, 493 A.2d 1074,
1079 (Md. 1985) ("[A] professional degree or license does not possess any of the basic
characteristics of property within the ambit of [the State Property Disposition in Divorce
and Annulment Law].").
10 For example, while contract options existed for decades, it was only during the past
20 years that markets in options developed. Options were standardized, and a legal infra-
structure was designed for markets in them. See Multiple Trading of Options, Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-24613, 38 S.E.C. Docket (CCH)
865, 867 (June 18, 1987) (citing SECURITIES EXCH. COMM'N FOR USE OF HOUSE COMM.
ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL STUDY OF THE OPTION MARKETS TO THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMIS-
SION 1 (Comm. Print 1979)). Similarly, swaps have been standardized and traded. See
William P. Rogers, Jr., Interest Rate and Currency Swaps: The Secondary Market, in
INTEREST RATE AND CURRENCY SWAPS 23-44 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 603, 1988). Therefore, if we wish to encourage the movement to
market certain legal relationships, we should classify these legal relationships as property
and apply property rules to them. Without reclassification, efficient markets do not
develop. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 2, § 1.9.2, at 22.
11 Examples of propertized relationships that are not for sale are college degrees. Col-
lege degrees are not transferable because they represent the personal achievement of the
holder of the degree. Transfer to others would mislead third parties. Similarly, although
pension rights are property rights under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered
1993]
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To summarize my arguments: (i) efficient markets require both contract
and property rules, (ii) some property rules are designed to satisfy the essen-
tial conditions for efficient markets, (iii) contract and property rules may
conflict, and, (iv) when they conflict, property rules should prevail over con-
tract rules.
I. ON CONTRACT AND PROPERTY
A. The Prototypes
Contract and property prototypes differ; in some respects they are com-
patible, and in others they conflict. The contract prototype posits a relation-
ship consisting of promises enforceable by law. 2 Although the parties'
interests may conflict, each party expects to benefit from the contract
relationship.
The property prototype differs from contract in a number of ways. The
property prototype posits a relationship between a person with property
rights (the owner) and others. The relationship has two aspects, depending
on the context in which it arises. One is the context of the owner's rights vis-
i-vis others.' 3 The second is the context of the owner's trading in her owner-
ship rights with others. In this context, the property prototype is focused on
enhancing efficient markets. Because efficient markets require strong and
clear property rights, the two aspects of the prototype-the owner's relation-
ship with market traders and her relationship to others regarding her prop-
erty rights-are closely related.
The prototypes also contain implicit or explicit assumptions about the
character of the parties-their motivations, expectations, and anticipated
behaviors. These assumptions serve as criteria for classifying new candidates
to membership in a contract or property category. Implicit in the contract
prototype is the assumption that parties interact freely to reach a bargain
from which each hopes to benefit. Further, the contract prototype assumes
that parties possess relatively equal bargaining power, are independent of
other parties, and can fend for themselves. By comparison, the property
prototype posits the owner both as the dominant party in her relationship
sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, and 42 U.S.C.), they are transferable only pursuant to a
statutory scheme.
12 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979) (defining a contract as "a
promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the per-
formance of which the law in some recognizes as a duty"). For the exception of the
unilateral contract, see Mark Pettit, Jr., Modern Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U. L. REV.
551, 552 (1983).
11 These rights range from the right to entry and use of property-an easement, for
example-to an entitlement to exclude others from property. See RAY A. BROWN, THE
LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 1.5, at 6 (Walter B. Raushenbush ed., 3d ed. 1975)
("Ownership, or the right of property, is... a collection or bundle of rights, of legally
protected interests.").
[Vol. 73:389
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with others regarding her property, and also as an "equal" contract party
concerning the transfer of her property rights.14
B. Values
The guiding value of contract law, subject to few exceptions,15 is that
society supports individuals' freedom to interact by mutually consenting to
binding exchange relationships-free of coercion, and free of law's (govern-
ment's) interference. The government intervenes in the contract relationship
only upon the request of a party to enforce the bargain, and bargains are
generally enforced if made under the conditions assumed in the contract pro-
totype-that is, the parties consent freely to enter into the relationship, that
they can fend for themselves, and that they have capacity to enter into the
relationship.'
The values underlying property law reflect the two aspects of the property
prototype. First, society supports the property owner's dominion over her
property-her right to exclude others from her property, and to do with the
property as she wishes. Even though the owner's dominion is limited by
laws that protect third parties from harm or promote social policies, 7 the
owner's dominion is the starting point and "default" value; the limitations,
however numerous, are perceived as exceptions.
Second, society places high value on the liquidity of property-on facili-
tating efficient markets in, and the movement of, property-hopefully to
those who can make it most productive.' To this end, the owner's rights to
do with her property as she wishes are subject to regulation when she
engages in market activities. Her dominion and her contract freedoms are
curtailed by the conditions necessary to create and maintain efficient
markets.
Thus, the values underlying both contract and property law recognize the
parties' freedom,' 9 but differ in the extent and nature of this freedom.
1 See id. at 7 ("[O]ne of the attributes of [a property owner's] ownership is the power
to confer upon others one or more of his various interests in it while retaining some of the
others.").
15 One exception is a contract contrary to public policy; another is an illegal contract.
See 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1373-1375, at 1-20 (1963).
16 See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §§ 4.4-.5, at 379-
90, § 4.19, at 443-44, § 4.26, at 478-90 (1990).
1 See Gerald Bowden, Protecting Our Environment Through Legislation: Approaching
a New Concept of Property, 4 REAL EST. L.J. 165, 174 (1975) ("[T]raditional liberal
notions ... place individual interests above the collective social interest.").
18 See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, §§ 11. 1-.2, at 58-67; 5 HERBERT T. TIFFANY &
BASIL JONES, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1343, at 161-62 (3d ed. 1939 & Supp.
1992).
19 Both freedoms are constitutionally protected from government encroachment. U.S.
CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
19931
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Contract law represents the freedom to interact with others, free of
government coercion. The freedom is limited by the power of others to
withhold their consent to interact, and by the power of parties to limit their
own freedom through agreements with others, for example, in exclusive bro-
kerage contracts.
The value structure of the property prototype is more complex. With
respect to the relationship between an owner and others regarding her prop-
erty rights, the owner's freedom from coercion of others is both stronger and
more unilateral than the comparable freedom of contract parties. The values
underlying property law support the right to control the use of one's prop-
erty independently of the consent of others. As compared to contract rights,
property rights are also supported by stronger remedies.' However, the
owner's freedom from government intervention, however, is weaker than
that of a contract party.
With respect to the relationship between a property owner and other mar-
ket traders, the high value society places on efficient markets is not always
compatible with contract freedom from government intervention, and when
the two values conflict, property law can override the freedom of contract.2'
pensation."); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the
obligation of contracts.").
20 For example, a lender cannot control the borrower's use of the loan proceeds except
when the loan agreement specifically so provides. However, a beneficial owner of prop-
erty under the control of another is entitled to judicial protection as of the first day when
control passed. The controlling fiduciary is regulated as to how to deal with the property,
even though the parties did not explicitly contract to that effect. In addition, the benefi-
cial owner is entitled to accounting, and to the imposition of a constructive trust on his
fiduciary's improper profits. See generally Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L.
REV. 795 (1983).
The history of pension rights is instructive. Pensions were first considered charity, not
legally enforceable. Pensions evolved into contract rights, and under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) became beneficial property rights
(although the transferability of the rights is limited for public policy reasons). See Rus-
SELL K. OSGOOD, THE LAW OF PENSIONS AND PROFIT SHARING § 11.1.7, at 271-72
(1984).
One unique case demonstrates the difference between contract and property remedies.
In Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1979), the Supreme Court imposed a construc-
tive trust on the proceeds from a book written by a former CIA agent. Id. at 515. The
agent published the book in breach of his agreement with the CIA, in which he under-
took not to publish material about the agency without its prior approval. Id. at 507-08.
The government could not collect under contract law, however, because it could not
show damages. Id. at 509-10. The Court awarded the government a property remedy.
The published information (although it was public) was "propertized" as government
property. Because this property was used without the owner's permission, the Court
imposed a constructive trust on profits from the information and ordered the profits paid
to the government. Id. at 515-16.
21 For example, property law will override the freedom of contract parties to restrict
the alienation of property. I recognize exceptions for unique types of property, such as
[Vol. 73:389
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C. Policies, Certainty of Boundaries, and Rules
The policies of both contract and property law aim at reducing peoples'
planning costs and transaction costs. Planning is facilitated by rules that
remove, as much as possible, ambiguities and legal risks in the relationships.
For example, contract law contains rules that help the parties ascertain the
existence of the contract,2 2 and property law promotes certainty through
rules about the possession and transfer of property rights.23
Thus, the policies of both contract and property law include creating cer-
tainty and predictability to reduce the parties' planning and transaction
costs. Not surprisingly, however, the rules in each category have a different
focus. Contract law focuses on the contract parties. Property law focuses on
the market actors. The different focuses can result in conflicting rules.
II. WHERE CONTRACT AND PROPERTY CONFLICT
Although contract and property policies share some features, as well as
the goal of reducing the actors' transaction costs, in some respects they also
differ and conflict. While both contract and property law interfere with peo-
ples' freedom to interact and to act within their relationships, contract law
accords more deference to the agreement that the parties establish for them-
selves than property law.24 As compared to contract, property law interferes
far more in the terms of the parties' agreement. Property law imposes quan-
titatively more, and qualitatively stricter, conditions for the enforcement of
property relationships.
The guiding rules in contract law, therefore, are that the parties' agree-
ment governs the relationship and that courts should limit their interference
in contract terms and avoid designing the contract for the parties. "Hard
bargains" are enforced so long as the initial bargain met the traditional con-
ditions for contract formation.' There are, of course, exceptions that
intellectual property, for which the second aspect of the property prototype is less impor-
tant than the first.
22 For contract rules regarding consideration and formalities, see 1 FARNSWORTH,
supra note 16, § 1.6, at 23-24, § 2.16, at 126-29; 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, §§ 7.1-
.2, at 191-98.
23 See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983) (distinguishing "boilerplate" trust inden-
ture clauses from "contractual provisions which are peculiar to a particular indenture");
infra note 59.
24 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 cmt. b (1979) ("Only
infrequently does legislation, on grounds of public policy, provide that a term is
unenforceable.").
25 See HOWARD 0. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1.02 (1986) (although
the victim of a breach of contract "does not necessarily [under common law] get the
performance that he wanted,. . . he gets the value of the performance, or an approxima-
tion of it in money"); Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553,
1993]
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depend on public mores and the type of contract.2 For example, the courts
today will not enforce contracts of adhesion, and might interfere in long-
term contract relationships,' based on the assumed intention of the par-
ties.28 Such expanded judicial interpretation can result in judge-made con-
576 (1933) ("[Ihe classical view [is that] the law of contracts gives expression to and
protects the will of the parties, for the will is something inherently worthy of respect.").
26 Historically, courts strictly followed the policy of minimal interference in contract.
For example, until the late 1920s, insurance contracts contained unconscionable provi-
sions, such as the required forfeiture of policies' cash values on default of premium pay-
ments. Yet, consistent with contract law policies, the courts upheld and enforced these
terms of the policies. See, e.g., Illinois Bankers Life Assurance Co. v. Tennison, 213 P.2d
848, 852 (Okla. 1949) ("[C]ourts will not make a better contract for the parties than they
saw fit to make, or alter their contract for the benefit of one [party]."); 3A JOHN A.
APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE WITH FORMS § 1751,
at 62-63 (1967); S.S. HUEBNER & KENNETH BLACK, JR., LIFE INSURANCE 402 (7th ed.
1969). Similarly, the courts viewed legislation establishing a minimum wage as interfer-
ing with the parties' freedom of contract. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S.
525, 553 (1923) (minimum wage regulations impermissibly restricted "liberty of con-
tract"), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-65 (1905) (invalidating a state law limiting the maximum
number of hours certain employees could work each week as an impermissible state inter-
ference with the liberty of contract), overruled by Day-Bright Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri,
342 U.S. 421 (1952).
27 See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, § 4.26, at 478-90. Judicial intervention in
"relational contracts" may conflict with the assumption that contracts reflect the parties'
expectations. See IAN R. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND
RELATIONS 14-16 (2d ed. 1978) (constructing a spectrum of contractual behavior
between "relational" and "transactional" behavior); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (1981) (describing the "two
doctrinal linchpins of relational contracts [as] the obligation of one party (the 'agent') to
use its 'best efforts' to carry on an activity beneficial to the other (the 'principal'), and the
concomitant right of the principal to terminate the relationship").
28 The change might be explained as a broader interpretation of the elements of
contract formation, rather than as a change in the policy of non-interference in the par-
ties' agreement. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (refusing to enforce a one-sided bargain); Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
415 F. Supp. 264, 269 (E.D. Mich. 1976) ("[T]he notion of free will has little meaning as
applied to one who is ignorant of the consequences of his acts."); Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 99-100 (N.J. 1960) (an automobile purchaser may
recover damages for personal injuries arising because of a defect in the product, even
though the purchaser lacked privity with both the dealer and the manufacturer); Jackson
v. Seymour, 71 S.E.2d 181, 184 (Va. 1952) (granting relief based on constructive fraud);
MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS 74 (1990) (according to the cases and the Uniform Commercial Code, "where
circumstances indicate that one party did not, or could not fully comprehend its meaning
of the contract, then the court is free to use its own judgment to determine whether the
contract terms are fair"); Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal,
18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975) (courts should enforce all contracts unless there is proof of
[Vol. 73:389
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tract terms, which seems to conflict with the guiding policy of judicial non-
interference.'
Even though contract law today interferes in the parties' relationships
more than it did in the past, property law remains the comparatively more
intrusive category. For example, absolute dominion over property has given
way to overriding laws: zoning laws,' housing codes,31 and government-
forced sales,32 to name just a few. This interference has increased as the view
of property rights has changed from unconditional dominion to dominion
subject to responsibilities and duties.13
Just as importantly, because an overriding policy of property law is to
encourage markets,' the law curtails the power of owners to carve up future
and present property rights for transfer and prescribes the forms of these
transfers. These limitations reflect the necessary conditions for creating and
facilitating markets; yet these limitations can conflict with contract freedom.
Thus, contract and property laws are often incompatible.
"some defect in the process of contract formation ... or ... some incompetence of the
party against whom the agreement is to be enforced").
29 Without alternatives, a person may have been free in theory, but bonded in fact.
For example, if freedom is unrelated to limited choice, then there is no such thing as
unemployment: an individual without choice may indeed "freely" opt to work a 16-hour
day for a loaf of bread. Adopting similar theories of freedom, courts at one time enforced
burdensome contracts entered into by parties with severely limited choice, and invali-
dated legislative attempts to establish minimal terms for these parties. Yet unless work is
available on terms that allow workers to maintain a minimal standard of living, such
contracts are coercive in a very real sense. The meaning of "minimal" is, of course,
debatable.
30 See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 132-33 (1978)
(upholding a landmark preservation law severely restricting owners' rights to develop the
airspace over their property); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395-96 (1926)
(a decrease in property value caused by a zoning ordinance made in the public interest
required no compensation under the Fifth Amendment).
31 See, e.g., Help Hoboken Hous. v. City of Hoboken, 650 F. Supp. 793, 799 (D.N.J.
1986) (an ordinance requiring landlords to rent vacant apartments to paying tenants was
not an unconstitutional taking, nor a violation of due process or equal protection).
32 See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1984) (upholding a
state scheme to take title to real property from lessors and transfer it to lessees to reduce
concentration of land ownership); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,
304 N.W.2d 455, 459-60 (Mich. 1981) (upholding a government-mandated conveyance of
a large tract of land to a large private corporation for an assembly plant).
13 "The net effect of police power regulations, environmental law, and public trust
doctrines has been to make many decisions [regarding land use into] joint ventures
between the individual and the state. Clearly, our concept of property is changing."
John E. Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of Property,
1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 26.
3 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-13 (1972)
("[T]he legal protection of property rights has an important economic function: to create
incentives to use resources efficiently.").
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I do not suggest that our markets today can exist without strong contract
rights. Binding contracts are essential for the creation of our markets.
Indeed, markets exist to help increase the number of binding contracts. I do
suggest that, in addition to contract law, markets require an infrastructure
that is grounded in property law. Markets are not quintessentially in the
contract domain.
The following subparts examine four areas in which property law inter-
feres in the parties' relationships more than contract law. These areas are:
the terms of the relationship, the nature of the rights, publicity and transfer-
ability of the transactions, and the existence of intermediaries. Each of these
areas affects the conditions for creating and maintaining efficient markets.
The desirability of efficient markets justifies the priority of the property law
over contract law.
A. The Terms of the Relationship--Standardization
Contract and property law differ on the extent to which they allow the
parties to determine the terms of their arrangement. Under contract policy,
parties may design their relationships as they wish-subject to a few impor-
tant exceptions, such as the prohibition on illegal contracts and on agree-
ments in restraint of trade.35
In contrast, property rules impose numerous restrictions on sellers,
depending on the products and markets involved. One type of restriction is
the required standardization of various aspects of transactions. 6 Standardi-
zation fosters the creation and efficiency of markets. It reduces buyers'
information costs about products and transaction terms and avoids confu-
sion among market actors. For example, official weights, quantity stan-
dards, and labeling requirements 7 facilitate the calculation and comparison
of prices for products and their substitutes. Standardized forms of real
estate transfers and standardized classes of substantive property rights in
real estate have a similar effect.as
35 See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, § 5.3, at 16-27.
36 See generally MASS. GEN. L. ch. 183, §§ 16-17 (1990) (standardizing "warranty"
and "quitclaim" covenants); TIFFANY & JONES, supra note 18, §§ 756-828, at 199-400.
37 See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 810 (1992) (official U.S. grain standards); 9 C.F.R. § 317 (1992)
(federal labeling requirements for meat products). The Federal Bureau of Standards is
charged with establishing measures and standards.
38 For centuries, property rights in real estate have been standardized. The law
acknowledges the transfer of about 15 distinct "packages" of property rights; only trans-
fers of these rights can be enforced. See Lawrence C. Becker, The Moral Basis of Property
Rights, in XXII NoMos 190-92 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
The various interests involved can be classified into four general classes: freehold estates,
non-freehold estates, concurrent estates, and future interests. See ROGER A. CUNNING-
HAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.1, at 80-81 (1984). Today, some subcategories
of property law, such as leases, tend toward the contract model, allowing the parties to
agree on non-standard rights. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY
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To be sure, there are exceptions to standard property rights. For example,
trusts can be used to customize official "packages" of rights and graft over
them a second layer of custom-made groups of property rights. Further,
markets can develop in unique non-standard items, such as whole loans.39
Not all standards are, or should be, mandatory. Notwithstanding the excep-
tions, property law policies support standardization far more than contract
law policies do.'
B. The Nature of the Rights
Contract and property law differ on the extent to which the parties may
design their rights free of law's intervention. Contract law allows the parties
to design their bargain. With few exceptions, such as the prohibition on
penalty damages,4 ' they can modify the law of remedies for breach by draft-
ing unique substantive contract rights and remedies.' Further, because
rules regarding contract terms are mostly permissive, the rights under a par-
ticular contract may be expressed in vague terms, by intentional or negligent
43drafting.4
386-87 (2d ed. 1988) ("[C]ourts... are coming more and more to emphasize the contrac-
tual nature of leases, with important consequences."). Nonetheless, today, as before, con-
straints on the design of rights are greater in property law than in contract.
I See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 2, § 2.6, at 54-56 (describing the market in whole
loans). See generally Crockett, supra note 8, at 3 (describing steps that facilitate trading
in loan participations, such as voluntary standardized designations of the traded partici-
pations and a plan to emulate the recording systems used in securities tradings).
Markets can also develop in works of art. However, these markets are relatively ineffi-
cient, requiring costly expert evaluations and costly intermediaries, such as art galleries
and auction houses.
40 Arguably, a parallel trend in contract law is illustrated by the Uniform Commercial
Code's general imposition of uniform meanings on transactions in certain markets, facili-
tating contract formation and reducing enforcement costs.
41 See 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, § 12.18, at 283-87.
4 For example, when portions of a large loan are sold as loan participations, the par-
ties can agree that the seller retain the rights to enforce the loan, and explicitly relieve the
seller of any fiduciary duties to the buyers. See 2 FRANKEL, supra note 2, § 19.5.1, at
261-64. Consequently, if the borrower fails, the buyers of participations have no direct
enforcement rights against the borrower and only weak remedies against the seller for
failing to collect on the loan. See id.
43 See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 2, §§ 7.22-.23, at 265-78, §§ 10.7-.15, at 424-47. There
is no law that requires a loan transfer to indicate clearly whether the transferee is a buyer
of the loan or a lender to the transferor, with a security interest in the third party loan.
Both parties might leave the classification of the instrument intentionally ambiguous.
Should the third party borrower fail, the transferee would classify the transaction as a
loan to the solvent transferor so that the transferor, rather than the transferee, will bear
the loss from the borrower's failure. On the other hand, should the transferor fail, the
transferee would classify the transaction as purchase of a beneficial ownership in the loan
and claim the full amount of the loan from the solvent borrower against the transferor's
creditors. The transferor may have similar motives for leaving the instruments unclear:
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In contrast, property law tends to establish strong and clear rights and
remedies. Efficient markets require that transferred property rights be as
strong, as clear, and as certain as possible. Markets in which too many
unexpected and conflicting property claims can arise are less efficient
because buyers' risks are higher, and because accurate pricing of such prop-
erty becomes costly and difficult.'
C. Publicity and Transferability
Contract and property laws impose on the parties to the relationship dif-
ferent duties to provide information to each other and to inform third par-
ties. To avoid confusion among the contracting parties about the
transaction, contract law imposes certain formalities requirements. These
formalities provide information to the parties about the status of their rela-
tionship. Otherwise, contract policies place on each party the responsibility
and cost of gathering the information needed to make the decision on
whether to enter into a relationship. These policies are faithful to the proto-
type of contract relationship because the prototype posits independent and
self-sufficient parties in face-to-face negotiations. Therefore, contract law
places the cost of information gathering on each party, and does not inter-
vene to reduce these costs. However, because the seller is an efficient and
accurate source of information the law imposes on her a legal duty to answer
the buyer's queries truthfully. Responsibility remains with the buyer to
ask-the seller need not volunteer information. As to third parties, contract
law does not require contracting parties to publicize the existence or terms of
the contract; they can keep their relationship confidential and can impose
such confidentiality in their contract. Third parties must gather the infor-
mation at their own expense.
Property law is quite different. Many trades require publication not only
of the transfers, but also of some of their terms. The reasons are not hard to
find. Information costs to market actors can be prohibitively high, especially
when trades are impersonal and buyers cannot seek information from sellers.
Therefore, publicity reduces buyers' information costs by making property
rights more predictable and prices more ascertainable. Under property law,
depending on the type of property, sellers must disclose information neces-
sary for buyers to make a decision on whether to trade, and if so, at what
e.g., to be free to argue the reverse, depending on future events. Because loan participa-
tions are deemed contracts, some loan participations can be drafted with such vague
instruments. Id.
44 See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 2, § 2.7, at 57 ("[T]he more standard and simple the
terms of the loans are, the more predictable their cash flow and maturity are, [and] the
more easily they can be priced and securitized."); Owen L. Anderson & Charles T. Edin,
The Growing Uncertainty of Real Estate Titles, 65 N.D. L. REv. 1, 90 (1989) (judicial
decisions rendering real estate title "less certain and hence, less efficient" undermine the
public policy of certainty of land titles that "encourage[s] investment in real estate and
... maintain[s] a healthy real estate industry").
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price. For example, the regulation of markets for consumer commodities
and food requires significant disclosure through labeling.'
Property law also requires publication of the transfer of certain types of
property, such as bulk sales of businesses46 and real estate. Property law
also encourages the use of standardized transfer forms for various properties
to reduce confusion among traders, to lower the cost of trading, and to give
third parties notice of the trade. Thus, property law allows parties far less
privacy than contract law.
Contract and property laws also differ and conflict on the extent to which
the parties may agree to allow or to prohibit the transfer of their rights. One
long-standing policy of contract law is that interpersonal relations should be
fostered, and one early contract rule was that contractual relationships may
not be transferred without the consent of all the parties." When new invest-
ment opportunities rendered some contracts--especially long-term ones-
disadvantageous, courts pushed contract law against the limits of its proto-
type to accommodate transfers of contract rights, for example, by allowing
assignments.49 Assignments do not render contract rights fully liquid, how-
ever.' In addition, if the terms of the contract prohibit its assignment, the
45 See 16 C.F.R. pt. 500 (1992); 21 C.F.R. pt. 101 (1992). Similarly, under federal
securities regulations, the sale of securities involves substantial disclosure obligations to
reduce the costs of evaluating the prices and risks to market actors. See Louis Loss,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 25-35 (2d ed. 1988).
46 See U.C.C. § 6-105 (requiring written notice to certain creditors of the seller);
Steven L. Harris, The Interaction of Articles 6 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Study in Conveyancing, Priorities, and Code Interpretation, 39 VAND. L. REV. 179, 183
(1986) (Articles 6 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code seek to avoid injury to credi-
tors "by requiring public notice of a conveyance of personal property").
41 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 183, § 4 (1990). "Customized" property rights, such as
trusts, receive special treatment. The special trust arrangement does not bind third par-
ties who have no notice of the trust arrangement, however. 4 AUSTIN W. SCOTT &
WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 284, at 35-36 (4th ed. 1989).
4 Historically, a person's contract was "a personal relation incapable of delivery." 4
CORBIN, supra note 15, § 856, at 403.
"I As markets developed, courts developed the doctrines of assignment and delegation
that allowed contract parties to liquidate their investments by selling contract obligations
owed to them. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317 (1979) (upon an
effective assignment, "the assignor's right to performance by the obligor is extinguished
... and the assignee acquires a right to such performance"); CORBIN, supra note 15,
§§ 856-866, at 434-59 (discussing delegation of performance and assignment of legal
duties); 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, § 11.1, at 58-59 (distinguishing between assign-
ment and delegation). Courts also allow contract parties to obtain a release of their
promises by compensating the other party. This escape route, however, is far less advan-
tageous to the party than a transfer of her rights.
I With few exceptions (e.g., the holder in due course exception) an assignee takes the
assignor's rights subject to the obligor's defenses against the assignor. See 3 FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 16, § 11.8, at 105-06. The obligor's liability to the assignee arises
only after the obligor is notified of the assignment. Id. § 11.7, at 98. While a sale of her
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courts will enforce the prohibition, barring a statute or strong public pol-
icy.5' Thus, the starting point in contract law, though subject to significant
common law and statutory exceptions, is that a contract is personal and not
transferable. Indeed, transferability is the exception.
In contrast to the law of contract, property law is strongly biased in favor
of transferability of property rights and is hostile to limitations on transfera-
bility. 2 The starting point in property law is that property rights should be
transferable. Unless imposed by statute' or by the unique nature of the
particular property rights,' restrictions on alienation should be the excep-
tions. Total restrictions should be unenforceable.'
entire interest in property (not a lease), terminates any non-contractual relationships she
may have with other persons with respect to the property, a contracting party can only
assign her rights under the contract, not her obligations. Id. § 11.3, at 67. A contract
party can delegate her contractual obligations, but such delegation does not discharge her
from executory promises she made. Id. § 11.10, at 126 (to be relieved of her obligations,
a delegating party must obtain the consent of the obligee or the performance of the dele-
gate); see also ADDISON MUELLER & ARTHUR ROsETT, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS
APPLICATION 575 (2d ed. 1977) ("[T]he same concerns that applied seven hundred years
ago to limit transfer of land rights now are embodied in statutes protecting wage earners
and consumers from oppression that can flow from overly free contractual assignment.").
s1 Professor Farnsworth states that the Uniform Commercial Code has implemented
significant modifications "in the direction of free assignability." 3 FARNSWORTH, supra
note 16, § 11.4, at 83. Note, however, that these modifications apply to financial instru-
ments, and the legal regime for such transferable instruments is similar to that of prop-
erty law.
Partnership law offers an example of a compromise between personal and property
relationships. The formation of a partnership creates a highly personal relationship. A
partnership, however, is also a co-ownership. In order to allow a partner to utilize her
equity in the partnership, she is permitted to assign her interest in distributions from the
partnership, but not her rights as a partner (e.g., to vote and to manage the partnership,
to represent it as agent, or to examine its books). UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 502-
503 (1992). This assignment is thus not complete and will not fetch the same price as
would a full sale of the partner's interest.
52 See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 38, § 2.2, at 35, § 3.24, at 155. Such limita-
tions should only be allowed when necessary to protect investments and to encourage the
efficient functioning of markets. See RALPH E. BOYER ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 6.1, at 117 (4th ed. 1991) (as a general rule of construction, "[a] provision in a deed or
will directing that the transferee of property cannot dispose of the property is void as a
disabling restraint on alienation"); WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 421 (6th ed. 1988) ("Although some of the earlier
cases held that all restrictions on the transferability of shares constituted illegal restraints
on alienation the modern cases hold that 'reasonable' restrictions are valid and
enforceable.").
1s For example, ERISA limits transferability of pension rights to protect family depen-
dents. See supra note 11.
See supra notes 9, 11.
See 4 CORBIN, supra note 15, § 3.17, at 492 (distinguishing between prohibiting the
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D. Intermediaries
The contract law prototype is based on the assumption that parties will
negotiate face-to-face. The property law prototype is based on the assump-
tion that the parties are likely to transact through intermediaries. In fact,
efficient markets require the services of intermediaries because
intermediaries reduce the transaction costs of the parties.
One example of the utility of intermediaries is the securitization process,
in which intermediaries facilitate the movement of funds from savers to bor-
rowers. Pension funds and insurance companies hold much of the long-term
savings in this country. Because these funds do not engage in lending but
invest mainly in securities, they serve as a funding source only to borrowers
that can issue securities. Pension funds do not make direct loans; they do
not lend directly to mortgagors, consumers, and small and medium-sized
businesses. Using the securitization process, intermediaries can help direct
the flow of funds from pensions and other large pools of savings to mortga-
gors, consumers, and some commercial borrowers.' Different types of
intermediaries take part in the process. Some intermediaries make loans,
others convert them into securities, and some sell the securities to savings
pools and create secondary markets in the securities. Intermediaries thus
provide the channels through which funds flow from savers to borrowers,
hopefully putting the funds to the best use for the benefit of all.
In addition, intermediaries can be used in particular markets to reduce the
enforcement costs of contracts among parties. This role of intermediaries is
crucial in volatile markets, in which either the buyer or the seller often has
incentive to renege on her promises.57 The regulation of intermediaries in
property law and in specific legislation has no parallel in contract law, and it
may conflict with contract policies by restricting the parties' freedom to
interact among themselves and with their intermediaries.
III. RESOLVING THE CONFLICTS: PROPERTY TRUMPS CONTRACT
Many contract and property rules do not conflict.' However, when prop-
future conveyance of property by the buyer after transfer and prohibiting the assignment
of a contract right to future transfer).
56See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 2, § 3.2.1, at 69-72.
51 Because "[tiraders in commodities with volatile prices are exposed to a higher risk
of breach of contract . . .custom and law have shifted [enforcement] costs from the
contract parties to more effective enforcers: the market intermediaries. Since these
intermediaries have the incentive to execute transactions in order to earn their commis-
sions, the intermediaries were given powers to ensure enforcement, similar to escrow
arrangements . . . ." Id. § 3.2.3, at 78-79 (footnotes omitted).
I For example, both property and contract rules prohibit fraud against other parties.
Fraud on many market traders is as pernicious as fraud on one party to a contract. Yet,
even on this subject, property law differs from contract. The differences reflect the adjust-
ment of rules governing face-to-face negotiations for application to impersonal transac-
tions through intermediaries. Compare 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, §§ 4.11-.15, at
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erty imposes duties and constraints on market traders, property rules should
apply, regardless of whether contract rules are silent or in conflict with prop-
erty rules. Contract law is a broad and useful "default" category. It helps
maintain uniformity across situations in other categories of transactions on
issues that are not unique to market transactions.59 With respect to legal
interference in peoples' interactions in a broad sphere of activities, it applies
when more restrictive categories do not apply. Being the more pervasive and
permissive of the two categories, it ought to govern unless property law, or
rules in other special categories, provides otherwise.
When contract and property rules conflict, there should be a presumption
in favor of the property rules because our society places a high value on the
creation and maintenance of markets. The rules that regulate the markets
and provide them with an adequate infrastructure are housed in a separate
common law category-property law-and in legislative categories, such as
securities regulation. The rules in these categories should overrule contract
law. If no additional regulation is necessary to facilitate the creation and
maintenance of markets, contract law will apply. But if additional regula-
tion is necessary, it should be housed in a property category or in a separate
legislative category, and rules in these categories should prevail over conflict-
ing contract rules.'
CONCLUSION
I argue that markets require a legal infrastructure. "Free" markets will
not exist without law's interference in market actors' interactions. There are
certain conditions that facilitate the creation and maintenance of efficient
markets in physical, financial, or intellectual products. These conditions
include the reduction of information and transaction costs for market actors,
402-30 (describing the elements of common law contract fraud) with 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1992) (Rule lOb-5 promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988)).
11 This uniformity reduces the ability of the parties to go "category shopping" for the
general principles of contract law such as consent.
60 For an example in which property rules prevail over contract rules, see Sharon Steel
Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1012 (1983). Sharon Steel distinguished "boilerplate" indenture clauses from "con-
tractual provisions which are peculiar to a particular indenture." Id. at 1048. Boilerplate
provisions "must be given a consistent, uniform interpretation" because "[u]niformity in
interpretation is important to the efficiency of capital markets." Id. "Whereas partici-
pants in the capital market can adjust their affairs according to a uniform interpretation,
• . . the creation of enduring uncertainties as to the meaning of boilerplate provisions
would decrease the value of all debenture issues and greatly impair the efficient working
of capital markets." Id.
The rules of setoff in the context of securitization demonstrate a case in which contract
law is not trumped by property law. In my opinion, these rules contribute to inefficien-
cies in the markets for loan participations. See 2 FRANKEL, supra note 2, §§ 21.7-.12.3,
at 393-412.
[Vol. 73:389
1993] LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF MARKETS 405
and the use of intermediaries. These conditions must be supported by legal
rules. I classify such rules as a subset of property law.
To flourish, markets require both contract law and property law. Con-
tract law regulates relationships among discrete parties. Property law regu-
lates relationships among discrete parties on the one hand and the rest of the
market actors on the other hand. In addition, property law provides the
markets with institutional rules that impose the conditions necessary to
enhance market efficiencies.
Both contract law and property law provide the main building blocks for
market infrastructures. However, rules in these two categories can conflict;
property rules may impose regulations while contract rules leave the matter
to the parties. Assuming we wish to maintain market efficiencies, when con-
tract and property rules conflict, property rules should prevail.

